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Abstract
In remote areas of Bangladesh, it can be difficult for entrepreneurs, businesses and farmers 
to obtain needed bank loans, as banks are typically located in and around administrative 
centres. In addition, the banks have limitations in their product design (credit and savings) 
and have mostly avoided the challenges of rural enterprises. During the 1970s, the concept 
of the Microfinance Institution (MFI) emerged, based on the non-governmental organiza-
tion model and favouring locations in rural areas not far from the administrative centres 
and rural markets. In this untapped market, MFIs grew by taking an institutional good 
practices approach and offering products designed to cater to low-income households and 
enterprises, although they still face legal constraints in holding public savings deposits. In 
addition, although the MFI reaches less accessible areas because of its organization pattern, 
its attempts to upscale MFI credit are not widely successful due to both the unwillingness 
and inability of the existing microfinance client pool to repay loans. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to explore which entity (bank or MFI) has an advantageous geographic distribution 
and institutional good practices to meet the needs of rural enterprise.
Keywords: Microfinance; MFI and Bank Location; Rural Finance; Applied Geography; 
Bangladesh.
Resum. Geografia de la banca i les institucions financeres de microcrèdits entorn de les empreses 
rurals a Bangla Desh
En aquest article es pretén explicar les dificultats de les empreses i explotacions agràries en 
àrees remotes de Bangla Desh per accedir als crèdits que necessiten per dur a terme la seva 
activitat econòmica. La localització dels bancs en àrees rurals remotes de Bangla Desh mostra 
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la mateixa distribució dels centres administratius. A la dècada dels anys setanta del segle xx 
va començar a aparèixer la figura de la «institució financera de microfinances» (MFI), 
basada en les organitzacions no governamentals (ONG) i amb intenció d’establir-se a prop 
dels centres administratius i dels mercats rurals. Els bancs van evitar majoritàriament les 
empreses rurals a causa de les limitacions que tenien en el disseny dels seus productes (crèdit 
i estalvi). En aquest mercat sense explotar, les MFI van créixer per la seva actitud més 
accessible i pel disseny de productes financers més adequats per aprovisionar les empreses 
i les famílies amb ingressos baixos. Tanmateix, les MFI han hagut de fer front a problemes 
legals per poder participar en els dipòsits públics d’estalvi. L’increment del crèdit concedit 
per les MFI no ha estat gaire satisfactori a causa tant de la política de concessió de crèdits 
de les institucions com de la incapacitat de l’actual grup de clients de microcrèdits per 
tornar els préstecs. Per tant, és important explorar quina entitat (banc o MFI) mostra una 
distribució espacial i unes bones pràctiques que afavoreixi les necessitats de l’empresa rural.
Paraules clau: microfinances; localització de bancs i MFI; finances rurals; geografia apli-
cada; Bangla Desh.
Resumen. Geografía de la banca y las instituciones financieras de microcréditos alrededor de 
las empresas rurales en Bangladesh
En este artículo se pretende explicar las dificultades de las empresas y explotaciones agrarias 
en áreas remotas de Bangladesh para acceder a los créditos que precisan para llevar a cabo su 
actividad económica. La localización de los bancos en áreas rurales remotas de Bangladesh 
sigue básicamente la misma distribución de los centros administrativos. Durante la déca-
da de los años setenta del siglo xx empezó a incidir la figura de la «institución financiera 
de microfinanzas» (MFI), basada en organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) y con 
intención de establecerse en las áreas rurales no muy lejos de los centros administrativos 
y de los mercados rurales. Los bancos evitaron en su mayor parte las empresas rurales, ya 
que tenían limitaciones en el diseño de sus productos (crédito y ahorros). En este mercado 
sin explotar, las MFI crecieron a través de su situación más accesible y con el diseño de 
productos financieros más adecuados para abastecer a las empresas y las familias de bajos 
ingresos. Sin embargo, las MFI han tenido que enfrentarse a problemas legales para poder 
participar en los depósitos públicos de ahorros. El incremento del crédito concedido por 
las MFI no ha sido muy satisfactorio debido tanto a la política de concesión de créditos 
de las instituciones financieras como a la incapacidad del actual grupo de clientes de 
microcréditos para devolver los préstamos. Por lo tanto, es importante explorar qué entidad 
(banco o MFI) tiene una distribución espacial y unas buenas prácticas que favorezcan las 
necesidades de la empresa rural.
Palabras clave: microfinanzas; localización de bancos y MFI; finanzas rurales; geografía 
aplicada; Bangladesh.
Résumé. Géographie de la banque et des institutions financières de microcrédits autour des 
entreprises rurales au Bangladesh
Cet article tente d’expliquer les difficultés que rencontrent les entreprises et les exploita-
tions agricoles dans les zones isolées du Bangladesh pour accéder aux crédits nécessaires à 
la réalisation de leur activité économique. La localisation des banques dans les territoires 
ruraux isolés du Bangladesh suit essentiellement la même distribution que celle des centres 
administratifs. Les années 70 ont vu l’apparition de la figure de « l’Institution financière 
de microcrédits » (MFI) basée sur des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), dans 
l’intention de s’établir dans les zones rurales, à proximité des centres administratifs et des 
Geography of Rural Enterprise Banking Azim Uddin Mahmud 
and Microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh Antoni F. Tulla
Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica 2015, vol. 61/2 327
marchés ruraux. Les banques ont évité en grande partie les entreprises rurales du fait de 
leurs limitations en termes de design de produits (crédit et épargne). Dans ce marché encore 
inexploité, les MFI se sont développées du fait de leur meilleure accessibilité et grâce au 
design de produits financiers en meilleure adéquation avec les entreprises et les familles aux 
revenus faibles. Cependant, les MFI ont dû faire face à des problèmes légaux afin de pouvoir 
participer à des dépôts d’épargne publique. L’augmentation des crédits accordés par les MFI 
n’a pas été très satisfaisante à cause de la politique de concession des crédits des institutions 
et de l’incapacité de l’actuel groupe de clients de microcrédits à rembourser les prêts. Il 
est par conséquent important de déterminer quelle entité, (banque ou les MFI), offre une 
distribution spatiale et de bonnes pratiques favorisant les besoins de l’entreprise rurale. 
Mots-clés: micro finances; localisation des banques et MFI; finances rurales; géographie 
appliquée; Bangladesh.
1. Introduction 
Two types of financial institutions regarding banking coexist in Bangladesh, 
the formal banking institutions with universal banking services, Microfinance 
Institutes (henceforth, MFI) for informal microfinancing and few semiformal 
institutes with specific objectives. The degree of formalities of these types 
sometimes overlap few fields and scopes. The characteristics and objectives 
of these institutions vary, and exert a strong influence on the overall pattern of 
where financial institutions are located. Formal financial institutions are mostly 
based on market principles that enable them to survive in a given geographic 
context. In contrast, microfinancing entered into the society and the financial 
market through various philanthropic activities, and therefore differs from 
formal banks in policy, operation and sustainability. The primary objectives 
of microfinance are to eradicate poverty, create jobs, and help the poor and 
disadvantaged social groups. Through this process, microfinancing has become 
part and parcel of the financial geography of rural Bangladesh. Formal banks 
have comparatively less physical presence in remote rural areas and a conserva-
tive credit policy for rural entities (Beck et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009). Since 
their introduction in the 1970s, the concept of microfinance has become so 
important to the nation’s rural areas that this approach has achieved the formal 
status of Microfinance Institutes (MFIs). The expansion of MFIs and their 
programs gradually engulfed other financial activities in the rural areas. By 
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2013, the total number of clients reached nearly 33 million, with deposits of 
226.20 billion taka (2.31 million euros or 2.87 million US dollars)1 and 341 
billion taka in outstanding loans to 27.66 million borrowers (MRA, 2013).
The rapid expansion of MFIs through the Grameen Model2 in the 1990s, 
up to the present matured stage and subsequent turn to commercialization 
(Salim, 2013) in an effort to achieve sustainability (instead of remaining sub-
sidy-dependent), attracted the attention of global academic and international 
development economists. At this point, a comparative study of banks and 
MFIs is needed to determine the optimum structure of future rural banking 
in Bangladesh. The conceptual framework of this paper is focused on the geo-
graphic distribution of MFIs and banks, and how their services cater to rural 
enterprises. In general, banks are considered as a universal service provider, 
while the MFIs concentrate on a few specific objectives rather than providing 
all necessary banking services. The MFIs are also involved with a wide range 
of financial activities for social development. 
Due to the pervasive nature of MFIs and their programme-based social 
objectives, a wide range of academic and economic development practitioners 
have studied the phenomenon, including economists, sociologists, anthropolo-
gists, geographers and feminists. In the past four decades, the evolution of 
policy, procedure and programmes has reshaped the MFIs in ways that are not 
visible to the rural public they serve. The rapid globalization of the financial 
model, along with the global attention it attracts, has had a strong impact. 
Rapid changes in regulatory and operational policies have affected the data 
structure very quickly, even during the study period for the present research. 
Therefore, the study objective was limited to exploring which entity (bank or 
MFI) has the more advantageous geographic distribution and institutional 
good practices to meet the needs of rural enterprise in Bangladesh.
2. Rural Economic Geography in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a poverty-ridden, liberal Muslim country in south Asia with a 
population of nearly 155 million, in 2012, and a surface area of 147,057 sq. km. 
With a population density of 1,048 people per sq. km., nearly 70.6% of the 
population lives in rural areas, engages in agro-economic activities (UNDP, 
2012), and the vast majority are economically deprived according to national 
policy standards. The geography of administrative patterns in Bangladesh 
has shaped a “rural economic geography” that is highly influenced both by 
national administration policies and practices and by the market principles 
of financial services.
1. Taka is the currency of Bangladesh. 100 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) = 1.02 EUR or 1.27 
USD (December 2014)
2. Grameen Bank, a specialized Microfinance Institute, was the pioneer of micro credit in 
Bangladesh and introduced group-based credit delivery to the poor who do not have any 
capability to produce physical collateral against loans; under micro-credit procedures, the 
liability is shouldered by all members of the group.
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Bangladesh has 7 administrative divisions (regions), with 64 zilas (districts) 
further divided into 483 upazilas (similar to counties) having 4498 unions, 
the lowest level of the hierarchy. In 1793, during the British Colonial period, 
districts were divided into police jurisdictions named thana (literally, “police 
station”). In 1982, the 599 thanas existing at the time were upgraded to upa-
zilas with broader administrative responsibilities; in a few cases, thanas were 
combined to form a larger upazila.
Two different types of local government exist: in urban areas, 310 munici-
palities and 10 city corporations, and a hierarchy of rural councils3 (parishad), 
with district, upazila and union levels. Civil servants are posted to district and 
upazila administrative positions, observing a nearly parallel structure to that of 
urban areas, but the union parishad, the most local government, is an elected 
council (Ahsan, 2010; BBS, 2011; Paul and Goel, 2010). Since its founding 
in 1971, as the county has gradually become a development centre, thana 
headquarters have been considered a growth point for all sorts of economic, 
commercial and financial activities in rural areas. Rural branches of all com-
mercial banks (public and private) are located in these areas (Mallick and 
Nabin, 2011) and MFIs (nongovernmental organizations, NGOs) have also 
focused there. The rural financial market in Bangladesh is a less impersonal 
environment than in urban areas, is less document-centred, traditionally based 
on “soft information”, and is typically dualistic: formal and informal structures 
operate side by side (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Zeller et al., 2001). The private 
commercial banks have seldom considered these rural sites and when they do 
launch there, it is only to meet the regulatory requirements of the Central Bank 
to open more branches in rural areas.
Most rural areas have poor infrastructure and low levels of development, with 
informal and primary-level economic activities. The fragile subsistence structure 
of the rural economic areas continues to grow, embedded with crisis and dispar-
ity. Another concern is local and regional sustainable development planning 
and its relation with rural development. However, if we look to more developed 
nations for models, the idea of sustainable development is gaining ground in 
local and regional development policies. “Smart growth” relies on the market 
to drive decisions, which may (or may not) promote sustainable development. 
Nonetheless, this is not a policy driven by grassroots interests but rather a form 
of representative development, wherein stakeholders and interest groups can 
shape development policy and its implementation. In contrast, the government’s 
Local Agenda 21 (LA-21) relies on a democratic process to create goals, which 
are supported by the state regardless of market forces (Krueger, 2010).
In our case, if all the policies and institutional structures and cultures are 
in favour of rural enterprises, who enjoys a geographical advantage in rendering 
3. Civil servants are posted to district and upazila administrative positions, observing a nearly 
parallel structure to that of urban areas, but the union parishad, the most local government, 
are an elected council (Ahsan, 2010; BBS, 2011; Paul and Goel, 2010). The election in 
other hierarchy is quite irregular.
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financial services, banks or MFIs? Spatial distribution and development agen-
das featuring financial inclusion are highly interrelated with the development 
process. For a rural enterprise, formal financial institutions are more fenced 
off and conservative due to policy structure and geographical access. Inequali-
ties in spatial distribution and physical access excludes small firms and poor 
households in many developing countries like Bangladesh from using financial 
services, especially in rural areas, where distance is highly associated as a bar-
rier (Beck et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009). The spatial arrangement of financial 
intermediaries including MFIs in Bangladesh is important to the rural enter-
prise in need of financial services. Moreover, the absence of a perfect banking 
product for low-income households and microenterprises and the ability to 
target the relevant population to meet financial needs is an important determi-
nant (Presbitero and Rabellotti, 2014). The presence of a financial intermedi-
ary having a sufficiently wide network of bank branches is not enough to meet 
the need. Access to credit also depends on the product available and its socially 
arranged opportunity structure (Beck and De la Torre, 2007; Beck et al., 2007, 
2008; Uzzi, 1999). Examples of financially excluded people and small business 
are evident in the developed countries; consequently, the research community 
is increasingly focusing attention on the economically deprived, particularly 
after the global economic crisis of 2008. Mergers and acquisitions, rigid assess-
ment criteria, policy restrictions, etc., have excluded them from loans, even 
jeopardizing relationship lending that could help weak and opaque small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) (Appleyard, 2013; Dymski, 2013). On the other 
hand, providing services to rural enterprise requires physical proximity, and 
credit or debt servicing demands extra qualifications of the recipient because 
of the risk involved.
However, significant differences are observed within the ranks of the poor 
in rural areas. In Bangladesh, formal SMEs with a relatively solid foundation 
have access to commercial banks, while MFIs serve the extremely poor and the 
smallest enterprises. Between these two groups, a set of entities called “miss-
ing middle” enterprises are mostly underserved. Due to their heterogeneous 
characteristics, size, opaqueness and informal structure, they seem to always be 
excluded from formal financing. Secondly, they do not fall within the targeted 
objectives of MFI (Alamgir, 2009). Almost 90% of farmers live below the sub-
sistence level with a land holding of less than 2.5 acres (1.01 hectares) and are 
traditionally excluded from the MFI target clientele, typically the poor having 
less than 0.5 acre (0.20 hectares) of land. Lack of finance is the main concern 
for the larger landowners, as only around 27% of them get institutional credit. 
However, MFI lending to the poorer agricultural households for crops, live-
stock, etc., reaches up to 30% (Faruqee, 2010; Mondol, 2010).
A recent trend of MFI expansion to commercial lending and up-scaling to 
cater to a wide range of business initiatives has changed the overall MFI lend-
ing profile drastically. It is quite evident that the MFI has expanded from its 
earlier objectives, changing the loan data structure (Figure 1) that originally 
attracted world attention.
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The number of borrowers in the above diagram is higher in the higher 
range of borrowers ceiling. These data are comparatively new, showing a recent 
trend, although there is no clear distinction between urban and rural loans. 
Moreover, there are relatively important outstanding micro-enterprise loans 
(amounting up to 50,000 taka each) that total about 38 billion taka, nearly 
15% of the total outstanding microfinance loans (MRA Overview, 2011). 
Consequently, these data contradict the earlier MFI objectives, where com-
mercialization was viewed as mission drift.
The exact number of the micro-SME (MSME) sector is difficult to quan-
tify. Of the estimated 6 million MSMEs, almost 75% (4.5 million) are located 
in rural areas (IFC and KFW, 2009). On the other hand, the capacity to 
absorb the incremental rural labour force in agriculture is extremely limited 
due to land scarcity; therefore, a dramatic occupational mobility from farm 
(agriculture) to non-farm activities is observed. Unfortunately, lack of credit is 
a major constraint in expanding non-farm enterprises (Hossain, 2004). Anoth-
er problem is meeting the capital growth needs of microfinanced enterprises 
as they grow and are no longer part of the microfinance context. Even with 
a good supply of credit, the poorest of the poor microfinance clients remain 
underserved in Bangladesh. MFI clients that increase their activities seek larger 
loans, beyond the MFI capacity. 
Furthermore, and with very few exceptions, most MFIs are constrained 
by a controversial regulatory topic in Bangladesh: public savings accounts. 
Therefore, they rely on external resources, including donors (Source of Fund, 
Figure 1. MFI Borrower Profile according to MFI size and MFI as stated by number of 
borrowers, 2013.
Source: <http://www.mra.gov.bd/images/mra_files/Publications/microcredit%20in%20bd14072014.pdf> 
(Page 2, Table 2). MRA (Microcredit Regulatory Authority-Data) Overview, 2013. Annual Report, MRA, Dhaka.
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Table 1). The commercial banks in Bangladesh reach about 25 per cent of the 
total number of potential savings account holders; the rest of the market is 
untapped (Alamgir, 2009; IFC and KFW, 2009; World Bank, 2007). All these 
factors are at work within the geographical complexities and socioeconomic 
contexts of Bangladesh.
Table 1 shows the gradual growth of client deposits in the microfinance 
sector, and the growth of loans from commercial banks may be seen as new 
confidence. The gradual increase in the sector is a matter of great concern while 
there is a sharp rise and fall of the Donor Fund. The short period considered in 
Table 1 does not facilitate forecasting but it does give a picture of the present 
scenario. In addition, Grameen Bank, the largest MFI, is excluded from the 
data. It has nearly 79.84 billion taka in outstanding loans against deposits of 
116.43 billion taka. Grameen Bank itself has 7.98 million borrowers; the rest 
of the microfinance sector has 19.31 million (MRA overview, 2010)
In the academic and policy sphere, most of the rural enterprise finance lit-
erature regarding “access to finance” either focuses on policy discussion or on 
the economic, institutional and legal obstacles. Geography is either neglected 
or poorly considered. The microcredit literature has generally paid limited 
attention to the geographic issues of distance and location (Presbitero and 
Rabellotti, 2014). Very few studies have focused on the geographical place-
ment, outreach and success of MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2010; Ravallion and Wodon, 
1997; Zeller et al., 2001). 
The spatial arrangement of formal financial institutions, including MFIs, 
is a relatively new frontier in the academic arena in Bangladesh, where the 
MFIs added extra concerns as they grew as an interventional agent, exposing 
the existence of and expanding toward the untapped potential rural market. 
To date, the basic principle of establishing MFIs has been to provide finan-
cial services to the poor, with the mission of eradicating poverty rather than 
developing business activity. In time, the changing objectives of global poli-
cymakers have shifted toward enterprise and MFI sustainability along with 
poverty reduction initiatives. In that view, the geographical coverage of MFIs, 
Table 1. Source of Funds of NGO-MFI, Bangladesh3
Source of Fund
Amount in Million Taka
June 2009 June 2010 June 2011 June 2012 June 2013
Amount % Amount % G% Amount % G% Amount % G% Amount % G%
Client’s Savings 40,527 29.7 47,436 31.2 17.1 63,296 34.5 33.4 74,989 33.6 18.5 91,178 33,0 21.6
Loan from PKSF 22,666 16.6 24,484 16.1 8.0 31,768 17.3 29.8 33,576 15.0 5.7 34,072 12.3 1.5
Bank Loan 23,896 17.5 23,006 15.1 -3.7 23,578 12.8 2.5 32,652 14.6 38.5 42,699 15.4 30.8
Donor Fund 4,110 3.0 4,109 2.7 -0.0 7,008 3.8 70.6 7,061 3.2 0.8 7,105 2.6 0.6
Cumulative Surplus 36,282 26.6 42,339 27.8 16.8 50,299 27.4 18.8 65,438 29.3 30.1 83,262 30.1 27.2
Other Fund 8,848 6.5 10,907 7.2 23.3 7,727 4.2 -29.2 9,535 4.3 23.4 18,391 6.7 13.7
TOTAL 136,309 100 152,281 100 11.7 183,676 100 20.6 223,251 100 21.5 276,707 100 20.4
Source: Annual Report 2013, Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA). G. Growth; PKSF.
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counting the ratio of microfinance borrowers as a percentage of poor people in 
Bangladesh, is depicted by the MRA to forecast the gap filling between poor 
people’s needs and the capacity to lend money (Figure 2).
After a long, historical start-up period of rise and fall, and after establish-
ing a good network of banks and MFIs, the underlying problem of access to 
finance for rural enterprise and households remains mostly unresolved. A very 
geographical question is still mostly unexplored: who (banks or MFIs) will 
advance, either by up-scaling or by down-scaling, to tap this ignored rural 
enterprise sector? In light of these multidisciplinary discourses, this paper has 
two objectives: (1) To determine which geographical factors influence the 
location of remote rural bank branches and MFIs, and (2) to find out which of 
these two institutions (bank branches or MFIs) holds an advantageous position 
regarding spatial distribution, along with credit and savings services designed 
to reach rural enterprise and to challenge the current status. 
Figure 2. Percentage of poor people related to MFI-borrowers in Bangladesh.
Source: MAP (2014) at <http://mapsof.net/map/bangladesh-districts>. Produced from data in “Annual 
Report 2012” (MRA, 2013, Bengali Version, page 45). Authors’ adaption.
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3. Relevant Theoretical Issues
From a global perspective, financial geography has long focused on global 
and national issues, such as globalization, international or national financial 
centres, and national financial systems (Clarke et al., 2005; Martin, 1999). 
There are also studies on sub-national financial systems based on metropolitan 
areas of developed economies (Marshall, 2004; Polese and Shearmur, 2004), 
or on the regional inequality of financial services (Klagge and Martin, 2005; 
Martin et al., 2005). Academic research on banking systems in the spatial 
perspective is well structured, focusing on regional banking and the develop-
ment of saving zones in the European context (Gartner and Flögel, 2014). 
Research on market-based expansion, based on data from Spanish savings 
bank, their entry effect and sustainability, has been gaining ground (Carbó-
Valverde, 2009; Dymski, 2013; Juan, 2002). However, Li and Xiongfei (2008) 
believe that financial geography and other relevant issues in less developed 
economies, particularly the less developed regions in these nations, remain 
the least explored. Few studies on bank lending to small firms have focused 
on how the organizational structure or the competitive environment of banks 
may affect small firms’ access to credit (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994, 1995). Evidence shows that rural and distant small firms 
are credit-constrained, even in developed nations (Alessandrini et al., 2010; 
Keeble, 1990). 
The distribution of traditional financial institutions is uneven across the 
nations. Distance as a geographic factor has a substantial impact on financing 
enterprises. The whole lending environment may be dependent on distanc-
es between the lender and borrower and the competitor bank (Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2010). On the other hand, a new dimension of distance (i.e. Opera-
tional Distance and Functional Distance4) has been discussed by Alessandrini 
et al. (2005), wherein the functional geographical organizational system has 
regulatory control over operational sites regarding loan approval, distance 
between financial institutions and SME, etc. Petersen and Rajan (2002) iden-
tified that distant applicants are credit rationed in the USA and argued that 
local lenders have an advantage in collecting soft information and strategically 
use this opportunity over distant lenders to serve SMEs. To mitigate informa-
tional problems raised by SMEs, a lending technology defined as “Relationship 
Lending” is used, wherein qualitative soft information is gathered on small 
enterprises and their owners through the passage of time. This approach was 
first formally sketched by Petersen and Rajan (1995).
Spain’s retail banking sector offers an interesting example due to the coun-
try’s large number of independent local markets to attract bank branches. The 
entrance of potential banks is basically determined by submarket character-
istics and subsequently product design of new banks has to comply with the 
4. The terminology was first introduced by Alessandrini et al. (2005) as a distance that sep-
arates the decisional centre from its operational point. Therefore, the power to decide to 
lend is preserved at the functional distance, away from local area of operation.
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strategic effect in the submarket (Juan, 2002). However, Spain has a banking-
driven financial structure to support the large SME sector, representing more 
than 99% of total firms (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). The recent literature 
highlights the abrupt shock to the Spanish banking structure after the global 
economic crisis in 2008, which hampered the geographic expansion of the 
savings bank system; previously, the number of bank branches had doubled 
between 1989 and 2008 (Alamá and Tortosa, 2012). The global crisis jeopard-
ized relationship banking in Spain, with a tendency to shift the credit flow to 
central institutions and reduce relationship banking in more peripheral regions, 
including low-income areas (Dymski, 2013).
Basically, financial institutions are likely to be located in rich areas rather 
than poor ones. The result is an absence of branch or delivery points in remote 
rural areas because the latter is adorned with bad geography: lower popula-
tion density, poor infrastructure and low income levels, along with various 
socioeconomic limitations and discriminations (Beck and De la Torre, 2007; 
Pandula, 2011; Zeller et al., 2001). A geographically centralized financial sys-
tem creates difficulties for firms – especially small firms – in peripheral regions 
to access funds. This is because of geographic distance as a physical barrier 
(Klagge and Martin, 2005; World Bank, 2007). In reality, a fully decentralized 
or a fully centralized financial system is rare. It is always difficult to identify 
the degree of this dimension (Gartner and Flögel, 2014). Even when financial 
institutions enter rural areas, they try to limit their exposure to agricultural 
finance and lend to the “collateral providers”. They tend to be apathetic to 
agricultural credit, and this keeps rural areas vastly underserved (Rhyne and 
Christen, 1999). 
A basic impediment is the asymmetric information flow between lenders 
and borrowers due to the distance between the two, which leads to credit 
rationing. In the case of a poor borrower, this invites collateral – and thus 
bank lending is infrequent in rural areas – as financial markets do not work in 
a space-neutral way (Klagge and Martin, 2005; Pellegrina, 2011). The process 
that excludes poor and disadvantaged social groups from financial access has 
a major impact on uneven development because it amplifies geographical dif-
ferences on economic development and income. When the credit sanction is 
determined by the geography of income and wealth, this conditionally shapes 
the geography of financial access (Leyshon and Thrift, 1994). This can be 
related to power and its relationship with space. The unequal geographies of 
power underpin the gap of economic inequality. Power is exercised rationally 
through interactions with other places and is considered relational within its 
own context (Massey, 2009), so the development is influenced by power poli-
tics through resource distribution planning.
Other than location, remote rural enterprises have limited or no access to 
formal financial institutions because they do not usually have reliable credit 
histories and assets for collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995; 2006; Zeller et al., 
2001). Microfinance procedures have broken various social conjectures, cre-
ating a group-based credit system of peer monitoring and social sanctions in 
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low-income groups that basically lacked collateral. Their success was gained 
through the dynamic model developed in the lending technology of Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and “Banco Sol” in Bolivia (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 
1996; Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). In the last few decades, the expansion of 
MFIs has raised a response in the rural financial market. Microfinance has 
changed the lifestyles and economies of millions of low-income households 
and enterprises in the entire world by giving financial services to those who had 
no access to formal financial institutions (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; 
Presbitero and Rabellotti, 2014). Thus, MFI growth occurred due to organi-
zational (not financial) limitations and the absence of formal banks in remote 
areas. Sometimes these banks operate in the informal economic sector. 
Government initiatives through public development banks in develop-
ing nations have also failed to meet the needs of low-income households 
(Chakravarty and Shahriar, 2010). To some extent, however, the Community 
Development Finance Institute (CDFI) in the UK offers a successful example 
of this approach. CDFI has gradually become instrumental in extending finan-
cial services to small businesses and people who are financially excluded by the 
mainstream financial institutes, particularly in disadvantaged areas (Appleyard, 
2013; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994). The Microfinance revolution in Bangladesh 
also emerged from the reality of credit constraint for poor households or rural 
enterprises. It is a response to imperfect credit markets and helps people escape 
the clutches of unscrupulous moneylenders (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; 
Mallick and Nabin, 2011; Pellegrina, 2011; Stiglitz, 1990). The coexistence 
of formal and informal institutions is viewed as a “Dual Financial System”; a 
common pattern of evolution in developing economies. In such a structure, 
banks enjoy a clear superiority in mobilizing funds but the informal sector is 
more able to gather soft information on borrowers (Tressel, 2003).
There is no correct micro-lending model in a given operating environ-
ment. And there are no two completely identical approaches to micro-lending. 
Experts have the opinion that microfinance is a kind of relationship lending 
and the large MFIs in Bangladesh basically rely on relationship metrics. The 
lender-borrower relationship, relationship-based lending and the informa-
tion-collecting procedure are indicators of the types of lending technology 
(Chakravarty and Shahriar, 2010). The lender-borrower relationship is con-
sidered for relatively weak and opaque procedures with SMEs, mostly in the 
informal economic sector (Berger and Udell, 2006; Uchida et al., 2006). Ales-
sandrini et al. (2010) emphasized the proximity of lender to borrower during 
the collection of soft information and argued the benefits of the loan officer 
who has personal contacts with the borrower, lives in the same community, 
knows people and firms who do business with the borrower, shares a common 
set of characteristics (cultural values, social norms and business language) and 
takes advantage of detailed environmental information. A few studies have also 
highlighted the location decision of MFIs in Bangladesh (Gauri and Fruttero, 
2003; Khandker et al., 1995; Ravallion and Wodon, 1997; Zeller et al., 2001), 
discussed below, as a key element of micro-lending.
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4. Geography of MFI in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, microcredit programmes are run by NGOs, Grameen Bank, 
state-owned commercial banks, private commercial banks, and specialized pro-
grammes of the Bangladesh government. Other additional facilities beyond 
microcredit (i.e. insurance, remittance etc.) are recognized as microfinance. 
NGO-MFI structures differ a lot from the banking sector regarding their 
objectives and location pattern.
To get a fresh comparative picture of banks and MFIs, just a decade ago 
the financial sector of Bangladesh was considered “less diversified and rela-
tively at an early stage of development” (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). 
Things have changed. Until 1982 all formal financial institutions in Bangla-
desh were government owned (Zeller et al., 2001). Nationalized Commercial 
Banks (NCBs), private banks and specialized5 banks have separate philosophies 
in choosing their branch locations. After the nation’s 1971 independence from 
Pakistan, they opened branches in small towns and bazaars all over the country. 
5. These are mainly development banks. Out of four specialized banks, Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank and Rajshahi Krishi Unnoyon Bank have a rural focus specifically on agriculture and 
these two are also considered as rural banks.
Table 2. Growth of Scheduled Bank-Branch in Urban & Rural Areas (1998-2012)
Year
Urban Branch Rural Branch
TotalNCB*** Specialized Foreign Private NCB*** Specialized Private
Br* G** Br* G** Br* G** Br* G** Br* G** Br* G** Br* G** Br* G**
1998 1336 146 29 838 2281 1029 312 5971
1999 1336 0.0 147 0.7 31 6.9 898 7.2 2280 0.0 1030 0.1 316 1.3 6038 1.1
2000 1336 0.0 150 2.0 34 9.7 940 4.7 2272 -0.4 1063 3.2 324 2.5 6119 1.3
2001 1335 -0.1 149 -0.7 33 -2.9 985 4.8 2271 0.0 1067 0.4 342 5.6 6182 1.0
2002 1313 -1.7 150 0.7 31 -6.1 1044 6.0 2170 -4.5 1160 8.7 363 6.1 6231 0.8
2003 1244 -5.3 150 0.0 33 6.5 1099 5.3 2147 -1.1 1164 0.3 383 5.5 6220 -0.2
2004 1241 -0.2 151 0.7 37 12.1 1150 4.6 2147 0.0 1177 1.1 400 4.4 6303 1.3
2005 1239 -0.2 151 0.0 41 10.8 1207 5.0 2147 0.0 1189 1.0 428 7.0 6402 1.6
2006 1238 -0.1 154 2.0 48 17.1 1288 6.7 2146 -0.1 1200 0.9 488 14.0 6562 2.5
2007 1238 0.0 156 1.3 53 10.4 1376 6.8 2145 -0.1 1203 0.3 546 11.9 6717 2.4
2008 1240 0.2 157 0.6 56 5.7 1452 5.5 2146 0.1 1205 0.2 630 15.4 6886 2.5
2009 1242 0.2 157 0.0 58 3.6 1594 9.8 2148 0.1 1208 0.3 780 23.8 7187 4.4
2010 1243 0.1 157 0.0 62 6.9 1803 13.1 2161 0.6 1225 1.4 1007 29.1 7658 6.6
2011 1245 0.2 166 5.7 63 1.6 1936 7.4 2192 1.4 1240 1.2 1119 11.1 7961 4.0
2012 1253 0.6 175 5.4 65 3.2 2069 6.9 2225 1.5 1265 2.0 1270 13.5 8322 4.5
Acc. Growth -6.3 18.5 85.4 93.7 -2.4 21.1 151.3 33.8
Growth rate -0.5 1.3 6.1 6.7 -0.2 1.5 10.8 2.4
* Br: Branch; G**: Growth; *** NCB: Nationalized Commercial Bank. 
Source: Scheduled Bank Statistics, Bangladesh Bank, Quarterly, October-December, (1998-2012).
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Despite this large branch network in rural areas, most of them are not catering 
to the poor due to the collateral requirement (Figure 3). Basically, the two rural 
specialized banks were established to provide subsidized credit at the grassroots 
level beyond the limit of urban capture (Alamgir, 2009; Charitonenko and 
Rahman, 2002). 
Banks have organized their branches by following administrative networks 
and focusing on well-endowed areas because they are guided by market princi-
ples; the role of commercial and foreign banks to reach poor households and 
microenterprises is very negligible (Alamgir, 2009; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2008; Khandker et al., 1995; Zeller et al., 2001). On the other hand, the com-
mercial banks have channelled the available rural deposits to support urban 
credit needs (Ferrari, 2008).
The branch growth rate of Nationalized Commercial Banks (Table 2) was 
negative both in urban and rural areas (–0.45% and –0.17%, respectively) in the 
period 1998-2012, although the trend started much earlier. Foreign banks have 
had no presence in rural areas but showed a growth rate of 6.1% in urban areas. 
Specialized banks were increasing at the rate of 1.32% and 1.51% in urban and 
rural areas, respectively; private banks had the highest growth rate both in urban 
and rural areas (6.69% and 10.81%, respectively). Typically, MFI branches are 
located in comparatively more remote rural areas than the rural bank branch; 
however, any municipal area is considered urban. Microcredit programmes of 
NGO-MFIs and Grameen Bank have infiltrated the rural financial market 
Figure 3. Urban & Rural bank branches in December, 2013.
Source: Scheduled Bank Statistics, Bangladesh Bank, Quarterly, October-December, 2013.
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through various supportive programmes. During and immediately after the 
liberation struggle, NGOs like Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC), Proshika and the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) were 
established – in 1972, 1976, and 1978, respectively – with various devel-
opment objectives. Later on, they added microfinance to their menu. The 
microcredit model was established through an action research plan by Nobel 
Laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus in the late 1970s. The early 1990s was 
an era of growth and rapid expansion all over the country. Before the incep-
tion of MFIs, microcredit was provided by rural co-operative societies; as the 
importance of MFIs increased, the role of banks and cooperatives in meet-
ing rural credit needs declined. The formation of the Palli Karma Shahayak 
Foundation (PKSF) in 1990 as a funding organization for MFIs has changed 
the scenario sharply (Alamgir, 2009; Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002; Gauri 
and Fruttero, 2003; MRA Overview, 2013; Zaman, 2004).
Population density and ethnic, social and cultural homogeneity have 
played a vital role in MFIs gaining ground and expanding. In addition, the 
liberal Muslim community showed tolerance, which absolutely contrasts with 
other Muslim areas like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, the Middle East and 
North Africa, where they played a negative role. Moreover, visionary leader-
ship and continuous donor support, at least at the beginning, smoothed the 
way in Bangladesh (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002; Cull et al., 2009; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Gauri and Fruttero, 2003; Ravallion 
and Wodon, 1997; Rhyne and Christen, 1999; Zaman, 2004). This donor 
dependency in the early stage of MFIs indicated that their objectives were 
driven by altruistic motivations like alleviation of poverty, job creation, etc. 
in contrast to a standard business model. 
The term “commercialization” has a negative image in rural society. In con-
trast, NGOs are supposed to be innovative, flexible and supportive to the poor 
instead of seeking profit. Even the government looks at dual objectives like 
profitability and poverty alleviation, taking a more political approach. Nega-
tive attitudes about NGOs, and others with a similar socioeconomic platform, 
affect NGO reputations; therefore, a fully commercial MFI – while perhaps 
more sustainable in the long-term – is controversial (Charitonenko and Rah-
man, 2002; Cull et al., 2009; Rhyne and Christen, 1999). In the mid-1970s, 
the popularity of microfinance in the global community was due to the under-
representation of women in Bangladesh (Armendariz and Roome, 2008). 
However, empowerment of women in Bangladesh through microfinance is 
highly appreciated in the academic arena. A study in Sri Lanka by Aladuwaka 
and Momsen (2013) reported that microfinance empowers women by provid-
ing them bargaining power in family decision making and also helps to achieve 
other gains, although the outcome depends on socioeconomic and cultural 
background. Armendariz and Roome (2008) and Kato and Kratzer (2013) 
made similar claims. However, the overall idea has been opposed strongly by 
Karim (2008), who found that although women are the loan receiver in 95% 
of cases, there is normally a husband or other male behind the scenes as the 
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end user of the funds. Karim accused Professor Mohammad Yunus, the MFI 
founder, of hiding the truth and claimed that researchers and NGO officials 
censor this truth from public information for several reasons. One of these 
is to satisfy the western donors’ mandate regarding economic participation 
by women. 
Nonetheless, the managing director of a large NGO commented that 
“Commercialization may be possible in few countries where per capita income 
is at least US$ 2,000.00 per year” (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). In a 
study of location decisions made by BRAC and Grameen Bank, Salim (2013) 
found inconsistency between branch placement decisions and the stated objec-
tives of profit maximization and targeting poverty, which are contradictory in 
practice. Such targeting (poverty) consumed 51.4% and 35.2% of profits from 
BRAC and Grameen Bank, respectively. Considering all these issues instead of 
full commercialization, responsive development is on its way to coping with 
the on-going demand. NGOs like ASA, BRAC, Proshika and others started 
a paradigm shift to new frontiers of microenterprise financing under various 
programme offers through the gradual expansion of lending to microfinance 
and even by shifting from group lending to individual lending. They started 
offering loans ranging from US$ 320 to US$ 6,700 (local currency: BDT 
20,000 to BDT 4,000,000 at that time), whereas the usual microfinance loan 
ranges from US$ 70-425, (BDT 5,000-30,000). 
At present, a loan amount up to BDT 50,000 is considered microcredit 
and above this limit as a microenterprise loan (Alamgir, 2009; MRA Over-
view, 2013; Zaman, 2004). Lending to SMEs, a slightly bigger “cousin” of 
the microenterprise, is not easy within existing financing practice. It is not 
small enough to attract microfinance and not sufficiently well documented to 
secure a commercial loan. Certainly, finance is not a charity and MFIs have 
to rely on subsidy or donations, at least at the beginning (Zaman, 2004; Zeller 
et al., 2001). After 2004, the MFIs of Bangladesh have reached a matured and 
saturated competitive stage. New-generation MFIs tend to be involved more in 
agricultural loans than in small business and housing loans. In this “new order 
competition”, lenders are “spatially clustering”, an indication of their sustain-
ability efforts (Khandker et al., 2013; McIntosh, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2004). Consequently, the up-scaling of the loan programme of BRAC failed 
to attract borrowers from the existing microcredit client pool due to unwilling-
ness, whether self-exclusion or inability to meet the criteria, of the potential 
clients (Emran et al., 2006). It is evident that the market imperfection and 
the lack of demand creation are important. The vertical expansion (amount 
of scaling up) of loans may not fully match up with the horizontal (geographi-
cal distribution) expansion due to the distributive pattern of inequality and 
poverty across the country. 
Nonetheless, the question of the NGO-MFI location factor is still to be 
explored. NGOs are non-profit organizations primarily guided by altruistic 
objectives. They may choose a poor area and may be dependent on donors who 
expect successes, and so they must find ways to avoid the risks of poor areas. 
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The actual motivation in selecting programme locations is always unknown. 
MFIs expand credit programmes where they are absent, without considering 
other types of institutions that may be present; the unofficial information-shar-
ing among them for “lending to the same person and selecting a programme 
in a same community of the village” is never followed (Gauri and Fruttero, 
2003; Mallick and Nabin, 2011).
In one of the few studies that have been published, Gauri and Fruttero 
(2003) found that NGOs open programs in a village, create local know-how 
and then move to other villages, even though this move is not widely accepted 
while it is a credit programme. They also found that the presence of an NGO 
credit programme influences others to choose the same location because it 
indicates a market. Khandker et al. (1995) studied the performance and sus-
tainability of Grameen Bank, the largest MFI in Bangladesh. They found that 
Grameen bank branch placement was not conditioned by its proximity to 
administrative centres; even agricultural production risk and flood prone issues 
were not found to be related with branch placement. Ravallion and Wodon 
(1997) found the same result and argued that Grameen Bank is attracted by 
areas where the gains favour the poor for giving them access to credit. Zeller et 
al. (2001) used thana-level data from the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of Bangla-
desh to identify the determinants of branch placement of MFIs – particularly 
BRAC, ASA and Proshika – and indicated that better access to transport, com-
munication infrastructure and proximity to a commercial bank are preferred 
for branch placement. They also found that outreach is significantly higher in 
thanas that have a higher distress (flood, poverty) index, which is completely 
opposite to that of the placement equation and general trends. 
Mallick and Nabin (2011) found that NGOs are primarily guided by altru-
ism but that they also seek financial sustainability. NGO coverage decreases 
with the distance from the main marketplace in rural areas, as this distance is 
associated with poor physical infrastructure and few sustainable opportunities. 
They also cited an example of applied geography from BRAC. In 2010, BRAC 
launched a new lending programme covering 40 districts in the country. The 
implicit cut-off radius was 8 km from BRAC branch offices (located in nearby 
upazila headquarters). However, BRAC does not officially make this “cut-off 
radius” available. 
Similarly, the South Africa charter adopted in 2004 had the target of 
bringing first-order financial services (savings, credit, etc.) within a 20 km 
radius of every South African (AFI, 2010). These issues of “Applied Geog-
raphy” are highly involved with the agenda of financial inclusion as a global 
policy concern. Conceptually, the geographic distance to a financial services 
branch or the density of branches related to population is a crude measure 
of financial access (Beck et al., 2007). A few other studies support these 
findings, which are almost identical to the situation in Bangladesh. Pedrosa 
and Do (2008) analysed the relationship between the distance separating 
households from microfinance institutions in Niger and found that, to cope 
with the effects of geographical distance, microfinance institutions adapt their 
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policies through more restrictive loan conditions, higher interest rates and 
more intensive screening. Presbitero and Rabellotti (2014) studied geographical 
distance and reached nearly the same conclusion regarding Colombia. Popula-
tion density and physical infrastructure may have an effect on expanding MFIs in 
developing countries.
5. Geographical Concentration/Distribution of Bank Branches and MFIs
The geographical concentration/distribution of banks and MFIs (tables 3 and 4) 
is highly influenced by various “Economic Geography” factors. Regulatory 
requirements, political influence, physical infrastructure like road and commu-
nication, availability of utility services, economic activity of the area, income 
of the community, number of other financial institutions in the area, etc., are 
highly influential factors in attracting bank branches. There were 8,685 oper-
ating branches of 56 scheduled banks at the end of December 2013, of which 
3,723 (42.87%) were in urban areas and 4,962 (57.13%) were in rural areas 
(Bangladesh Bank, 2013). Bangladesh has 67.59 commercial bank branches 
per 1,000 square kilometres and 8.19 branches per 100,000 adults. For auto-
mated teller machine (ATM) penetration, these values are 52.22 and 6.33, 
respectively (IMF website). By comparison, Spain has 96 branches and 101.46 
ATMs per 100,000 people (Beck et al., 2007; CGAP and WBG, 2010).
However, these values are changing comparatively fast due to responsive 
global innovation in technology and policy structure. On the other hand, the 
number of MFIs is openly controversial because there are both licensed and 
non-licensed MFIs in the market. There are nearly 5,000 NGO-MFIs in Bang-
ladesh, but at the end of 2013 only 730 NGOs had been licensed to operate 
microfinance services. Of these, the top 20 MFIs contribute more than 72% 
of total outstanding loans, deposits and borrowers (MRA Overview, 2013). 
A problem in comparing the MFI with banks is the data limitation of MFIs. 
NGOs are licensed/registered in various locations and with various organiza-
tions around the country, although since 2006 all NGO-MFIs are licensed 
by MRA. On the other hand, all the scheduled banks, except Rajshahi Krishi 
Unnoyon Bank, are registered in Dhaka, the capital city. 
The above chart does not mean that the MFIs are growing at the rate 
shown; it reflects licensing by MRA, although they were established earlier. 
The two largest NGOs and Grameen Bank cover all districts but most of the 
NGOs are regionally arranged (MRA Overview, 2011).
Grameen Bank, the largest microfinance producer in Bangladesh, is not 
included in the above chart, although it had 2,567 branches across the country 
at the end of December 2013, covering 81,389 villages (Bangladesh Bank, 
2013). For the last few decades, the development of physical infrastructure 
and the use of innovative communication technology in the sector may allow 
MFI branches to serve larger areas than before.
In urban areas, the coverage of state-owned banks in 2012 was 15.06% and 
private banks’ was 24.86%, while specialized banks represented only 2.1%. 
Geography of Rural Enterprise Banking Azim Uddin Mahmud 
and Microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh Antoni F. Tulla
Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica 2015, vol. 61/2 343
However, specialized banks cover 15.20% of the total rural share, indicating 
that they expand to reach more rural settings. On the other hand, the rural 
share of state-owned and private banks is 26.74% and 15.26%, respectively 
(Bangladesh Bank, 2013).
6. Conclusions
Uneven economic development, both in social and geographical distribu-
tion patterns, over time has created the existing image of spatial inequality 
in rendering financial services in Bangladesh. Much has been told about 
microcredit, but only some researchers have given importance to the financial 
Table 3. Division-wise distribution and growth of licensed NGO-MFIs (location of head offices) 
in June 2013
Division
June 2009 June 2010 June 2011 June 2012 June 2013
No. of 
offices %
No. of 
offices %
No. of 
offices %
No. of 
offices %
No. of 
offices %
Dhaka 195 46.6 240 45.8 273 46.4 273 44.2 294 42.6
Rajshahi 78 18.2 97 19.1 86 18.1 86 13.9 95 13.8
Rangpur** - - - - 34 - 34 5.5 36 5.2
Khulna 64 15.5 73 14.3 91 14.1 91 14.7 107 15.5
Chittagong 51 12.1 66 12.8 92 14.0 92 14.9 106 15.4
Barisal 23 5.6 30 5.9 32 5.7 32 5.2 38 5.5
Sylhet 8 1.9 10 2.0 10 1.7 10 1.7 14 2.0
Total 419 100 516 100 580 100 618 100 690 100
Number of 
Branches
 
16,851
 
17,252
 
18,066
 
17,977 14,674
** Rangpur Division was created by dividing the Rajshahi Division. 
Source: Annual Report 2013, MRA.
Table 4. Distribution (Urban & Rural) of Scheduled Bank Branch in Bangladesh by Division 
as of December 31, 2012
Division
Number of Branches
Urban
% in 
Division Rural
% in 
Division Total Div.
% of  
Total Branch.
Dhaka 1,591 53.46 1,385 46.53 2,976 35.76
Rajshahi 321 34.66 605 65.33 926 11.13
Khulna 324 38.80 511 61.19 835 10.03
Chittagong 781 41.76 1,089 58.23 1,870 22.47
Barisal 128 30.26 295 69.73 423 5.09
Sylhet 220 32.21 463 67.78 683 8.20
Rangpur 197 32.34 412 67.65 609 7.32
Total 3,562 42.80 4,760 57.20 8,322 100.00
Source: Scheduled Bank Statistics, Bangladesh Bank, Quarterly, October-December, 2013
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needs of micro and small enterprises and rural farms. Undoubtedly, MFIs 
will never be able to serve all the poor borrowers on the fringes of the sphere 
of formal financial institutions. Therefore, the coexistence of formal and 
informal (traditional) institutions is a common feature of the developing 
world (Demont, 2010; Tressel, 2003). How do the financial intermediaries 
(i.e. banks and MFIs) present themselves along with their products and ser-
vices to rural enterprises? This is an important matter to be explored. From 
our point of view, we identify it as the extent of geographical justification 
or financial democracy. 
Due to various market principles with a view to catering to rural enter-
prise, neither could the commercial bank network be extended overnight to 
the most remote site nor could the MFIs be transformed or developed to the 
strength of full-fledged financial institutions overnight. The rural economic 
geography of Bangladesh, along with its financial institution pattern, cannot 
support the needs of rural enterprise, although this could improve because 
there is recognition of the problem. The experience through ups and downs 
shows that microfinance has little extra qualification to reach the most risky 
clients in rural remote areas. Resource accumulation in prospective urban cen-
tres and the market principles of financial institutions logically do not cater 
to rural enterprise in general. On the other hand, the resource constraints and 
stagnation in development politics at the national level have created ignorance 
about policy formulation for the disadvantaged rural areas. Researchers have 
opined that policymakers may consider for-profit microfinance providers if 
MFIs are already behaving much like profit-maximizing institutes in a mature 
market like Bangladesh (Salim, 2013). For the last few decades, microfinance 
institutions have met the financial needs of the “economic bottom-line classes” 
and micro-enterprises of rural Bangladesh. Banks and MFIs differ in regard to 
their economic strength, nature of performance, principles and social objec-
tives. Considering the existing rural financial ecology and spatial arrangement 
of financial intermediaries, we need to find the problems and limitations of 
rural enterprise and farms as well as of financial institutions in order to create 
a demand-based financing environment. 
Primarily, microfinance is gradually becoming a major source of funding 
for rural enterprises in the absence of bank branches, often as an area’s only 
or sometimes comparatively better source of funds for that sector. For these 
enterprises, MFIs are present in the remote geographies, and are apt to deliver 
loans without a collateral requirement, unlike banks. However, the interest 
rate and loan term are not suitable for borrowers, who are being discriminated 
against in comparison to larger loans delivered by banks in nearby urban areas. 
The MFI growth and scaling-up of loan amounts in recent years invites new 
thoughts about sustainability and development. 
As per our study objectives, even if up-scaling or down-scaling is con-
sidered to level the playing field, we must explore and compare these two 
types of institution, banks and MFIs. Experts hope that if an enabling envi-
ronment can be created with appropriate methodology, private banks may 
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begin to cater to the top end of the micro and small enterprise and MFIs 
could scale up to micro and small enterprise as well as marginal and small 
farmers (Ferrari, 2008). Which of them has an advantageous location and 
the “organization-wide facility” to provide rural enterprise with access to 
financial services? That is the central question. In-depth research from an 
Economic Geography perspective would help to develop guidelines to high-
light the texture of the problem and the policy infrastructure required for 
proper rural development. 
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